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"THE TEDIUM OF IMMORTALITY" 
Garth L. Hallett 
The objection has often been made but has never, to my knowledge, been 
developed that unending life, because unending, would be boring. I survey, 
critique, and collate answers that have been or could be made to this objec-
tion: some mutually compatible, some not; some envisaging profound 
changes within us (timeless existence, no sense of time, tolerance of same-
ness), some not. Together, they make a cumulative case: there are various 
conceivable ways-neither clearly possible nor clearly impossible-in 
which eternal life might surpass all present felicity without a touch of 
ennui. Others may presently escape us. 
Though tedium is one of the most commonly mentioned objections against 
eternal life, I have discovered no halfway-thorough response to the objec-
tion. One reason, no doubt, is that the objection itself has received such 
skimpy development. Even Bernard Williams's oft-cited critique, which is 
lengthier than most, barely skirts the issue. 
In "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality," 
Williams identifies his title as that of a play by Karel Capek which tells of a 
woman called Elina Makropulos, alias Emilia Marty and various other things 
with the initials "EM," on whom her father, a sixteenth-century court physi-
cian, tried out an elixir of life. At the time of the action she is aged 342, and 
her unending life, as Williams comments, "has come to a state of boredom, 
indifference and coldness. Everything is joyless: 'in the end it is the same,' 
she says, 'singing and silence."'1 For Williams, EM's state suggests that it can 
be a good thing not to live too long. Indeed, on reflection her story suggests 
something more than the mere possibility of such an outcome. 
In general we can ask, what it is about the imaged activities of an 
eternal life which would stave off the principal hazard to which EM 
succumbed, boredom. The Don Juan in Hell joke, that heaven's 
prospects are tedious and the devil has the best tunes, though a tired 
fancy in itself, at least serves to show up a real and (I suspect) a pro-
found difficulty, of providing any model of an unending, supposedly 
satisfying, state or activity which would not rightly prove boring to 
anyone who remained conscious of himself and who had acquired a 
character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the course of living, 
already, a finite life.' 
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"Unending" and "supposedly satisfying"-the words indicate two distin-
guishable grounds of complaint that recur in this type of objection. In sim-
ple illustration, even if harp-playing was one's favorite form of entertain-
ment, it might pall after a century or two. But for those who did not find 
harp-playing so thrilling, it would grow wearisome a good deal sooner. So 
the challenge, as Williams sees it, is to adduce a state or activity that would 
be deeply satisfying and would be so even if eternally prolonged. Indeed, 
in Williams's view, not only would it not suffice to suggest an activity or 
state which might prove endlessly satisfying; "Nothing less will do for eter-
nity than something that makes boredom 11l1thin/wble."3 And what could 
that be? It is not unthinkable that even the beatific vision might eventually 
prove boring, since the beatific vision itself is, in the pertinent sense, 
unthinkable. Having set such a high standard, Williams makes one or two 
attempts to reach it, then desists. Eternity can have no attraction. 
Theologians, to be sure, have viewed things differently. Heeding 
Jesus' or Muhammad's announcement of blessedness to corne, they have 
recognized no need to prove that eternity will not be a bore, but instead 
have envisaged ways in which eternal life might be as blessed as 
announced. If their suggestions fail, they fail as plausible conjectures, not 
as surefire prescriptions: This, then, is how I propose to assess them. 
Treatments till now having been piecemeal, the time has come to ask: How 
well do the varied answers respond to the tedium objection? What verdict 
emerges from a comprehensive review of alternative solutions? Can any 
verdict emerge beyond the recognition that "no eye has seen, nor ear 
heard, nor the human heart conceived, what God has prepared for those 
who love him" (1 Cor 2:9)? 
1. Tota Simul Beatitude 
According to Hans Kling, heavenly life is "quite different from the banal-
boring, temporal timeless life described in Max Frisch's Triptychon. It is 
misleading to speak of 'after' death: eternity is not defined in terms of 
'before' and 'after.' What it means is a new life, beyond the dimension of 
space and time, in God's invisible, imperishab~le, incomprehensible 
domain."s In this new state, many have suggested, Boethius's definition of 
eternity as "the whole, perfect and simultaneous possession of endless life" 
will, at least to some extent, apply to us. For the soul, too, "a thousand 
years will be as one day, and one day as a thousand years. Its life has 
become like to the divine life and hence knows no past or future but only 
an ineffably happy present of intercourse with God."6 Time will not stretch 
out endlessly, boringly. No tediously recurring events or cycles of events 
will extend throughout eternity. All the fullness of a completely satisfying 
existence will occupy a single now.7 
This most radical solution to the threat of boredom also appears the 
most problematic. While many consider Boethian eternity an incoherent 
notion, others invoke analogy to save it. For, though they cannot intuit the 
inner coherence of such eternity, various considerations-divine 
immutability, knowledge of free human actions, freedom from contin-
gency, etc.-lead them to ascribe it to God. However, none of these consid-
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erations apply to human beings. And from the fact, extrinsically estab-
lished, that timeless life is possible for God, it would not follow that time-
less life is possible even for angelic creatures, much less for resurrected, 
corporeal ones. 
However, add the Incarnation as a further premise, and such an infer-
ence might seem legitimate. In The Logic of God Incarnate, Thomas Morris 
has argued that our present condition does not define our possibilities 
essentialistically, and that Jesus, being strictly, indiscernibly identical with 
God the Son, possesses all the divine attributes, including eternity.8 If, then, 
divine eternity is Boethian, and if Jesus is human as well as divine, it might 
appear to follow that Boethian eternity is among our human possibilities. 
This reasoning, however, has difficulties. For one, whatever may be true of 
Jesus, the rest of us are not and never will be strictly identical with God. 
For another, not even Chalcedon asserted the strict identity of Jesus with 
God or God the Son, and such an identification does not, in fact, make 
good sense. There remains, furthermore, the question of whether God's 
eternity is or can be Boethian. 
While recognizing the mystery in "simultaneous possession of eternal 
life," John Baillie has argued that "it is not wholly a mystery. Not even our 
human experience is wholly given over to temporality and successiveness."9 
In illustration, he cites William James's much-quoted observation: "The 
practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a cer-
tain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look 
in two directions into time./110 What precludes extension of this straddling? 
Again, with others Baillie invokes the purported words of Mozart: 
And now my soul gets heated, and if nothing disturb me the piece 
grows longer and brighter until, however long it is, it is all finished at 
once in my mind, so that I can see it at a glance as if it were a pretty 
picture or a pleasing person. Then I don't hear the notes one after 
another, as they are hereafter to be played, but it is as if in my fancy 
they were all at once. And that is a revel. While I'm inventing it all 
seems to me like a fine vivid dream; but that hearing it all at once 
(when the invention is done), that's the best.11 
How, we wonder, is such a thing possible? Even in the mind of a genius, 
how can successive notes be heard "all at once"? And the puzzlement 
spreads. If the notes were played, could Mozart still experience them "all at 
once"? Could God? Could Mozart's mental experience be prolonged in 
time, and if it could, would it prove endlessly satisfying? Could the 
Jamesian backward-and-forward-Iooking experience be extended indefi-
nitely backward and forward to form a single present? For us, could such a 
timeless present suddenly commence at some moment in time? Is that a 
coherent supposition? From whatever angle it is viewed, this first response 
sets the mind in a whirl. 
2. Heavenly Continuation 
Whereas for Kling eternal life is "not a continuation of this life in space and 
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time,"12 for others it clearly is. Notably, numerous Quranic verses promise 
the faithful such delights as "gardens underneath which rivers flow," 
"purified spouses," "paiaces," "abundant fruits," "goodly dwelling 
places," "immortal youths, going round about them with goblets, ewers, 
and a cup from a spring."13 Such a portrayal evokes William James's 
account of the idyllic summer sessions at Chatauqua: 
You have perpetually running soda-water fountains, and daily popu-
lar lectures by distinguished men. You have the best of company, and 
yet no effort. You have no zymotic diseases, no poverty, no drunken-
ness, no crime, no police. You have culture, you have kindness, you 
have cheapness, you have equality, you have the best fruits of what 
mankind has fought and bled and striven for under the name of civi-
lization for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste of what human 
society might be, were it all in the light, with no suffering and no 
dark comers.14 
And yet, when James emerged into the dark and wicked world again, he 
caught himself unexpectedly exclaiming, "Ouf! what a relief! ... This order 
is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too uninspiring."ls 
For James, making the culhrre first-rate and the goodness inspiring would 
not suffice to make Chatauqua a satisfactory foretaste of heaven. What was 
lacking, he surmised, was any element of risk, of danger. "At Chatauqua 
there were no racks, even in the place's historical museum."lh Neither, no 
doubt, will such things be found in heaven, to spice an otherwise hum-
drum existence. 
In response to this Jamesian difficulty, Calvin Linton writes: 
As to the irrationality of the popular view of the dullness of heaven, it 
is instructive to ask what fruits of evil, as we see them displayed 
before us rather vividly every day, will be so missed in heaven as to 
generate there unassuageable nostalgia and unhappiness. Tending 
the sick, fighting wars, enduring mental confusion and physical pain, 
poverty and starvation, the ultimate hopelessness of death-are these 
and hundreds of other conditions produced by sin so dear to us that 
we cannot bear to think of living without them 717 
Indeed, was the dearth of racks really James's problem? At least as 
dulling, one suspects, as the absence of risky, life-and-death struggle was 
the absence of any meaningful active involvement by James in the proceed-
ings. He was not a lecturer, teacher, student, performer, or competitor, but 
a spectator. One can therefore sense the relevance of Andrew Greeley's 
suggestion that the life to come "will be filled with the excitement, the 
wonder, the pleasures, the activity that makes life rewarding and exciting 
here on earth."ls 
Imagine your own heaven if you will. If it is to be a Christian heaven, 
you can dispense with the Greek image of people sitting around 
plucking musical instruments and not doing much else but look 
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vapid. The Christian heaven is active, dynamic, vigorous. It is not a 
place where life ends but rather a place where it continues. 19 
The blessed, William Schneider agrees, "are protected from all risk of 
ennui because they are always active, and their occupation, far from being 
a burden, is most varied and delightful."20 
Much activity, varied activity, exciting activity-and yet such assur-
ances leave us wondering what kind of occupation or variety of occupa-
tions could still prove exciting after a million, billion, or trillion years. I 
shall note three possible lines of response. 
3. Unending Progress 
Francis Newman observed that "to make a new life desirable it must give 
us something to do, something worth striving for, and a career by which 
we may improve in Virtue."21 To make the new life endlessly desirable, 
some theorists of the hereafter extend the striving and the improvement 
indefinitely. The blessed may be immovably attached to God, notes 
Edmund Fortman, 
But this need not exclude growth in an ever deeper awareness of 
God's ongoing creative love, an ever greater growth in friendships 
and fellowship, an ever greater growth in all fields of knowledge and 
enjoyment. ... They can go on growing, doing, learning, loving, striv-
ing, achieving, each in his or her own way and at his or her own pace 
and in the direction each wishes. 22 
Sometimes such projections stress moral possibilities: "Because the other is 
infinite subjectivity, the falling-in-Iove with love itself is progressive, and is 
ever in process of achievement, involving continuous transformation of the 
finite subject."2] Sometimes the conjectures stress intellectual possibilities: 
"However perfectly the Blessed may know God's Divine perfections, there 
will always remain infinitely more to learn. Though eternity is long, yet 
even eternity itself will not be long enough for even the keenest intelli-
gence among the Cherubim or Seraphim to measure the height and the 
depth and the length and the breadth of the uncreated and eternal God."24 
Though natural and seemingly appropriate, expressions such as these 
veil a difficulty. "Height" and "depth" and "length" and "breadth" 
sound quantitative. And such, it seems, they need to be, for the present 
response to work or at least to be at all perspicuous. There must be end-
lessly more and more of God, to be matched with eternity, moment by 
moment and eon by eon. Given the many paradoxes of quantitative infin-
ity, one may wonder whether divine infinity should be so conceived. If 
God is "immeasurable by any created mind,"25 is that because the mea-
suring would have to be endless? As for the subject of all this growth, 
one may wonder whether even elevated human nature will be endlessly 
capax divini, morally, intellectually, or otherwise. So let us consider other 
possible solutions. 
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4. No Sl'11se of Time 
"Eternity," writes A. van de Walle, "is in no way a prolongation of time. 
Heaven is not worship that goes on for ever! Eternity is a particular kind, a 
particular mode of being by which we transcend time, i.e. are no longer 
subject to time."26 This sounds like the first response, noted above. 
However, de Walle continues, "On earth we all know such experiences of 
happiness, when we no longer have any sense of time." Though still in 
time, we have no sense of its passing. In illustration, Lauren King remarks: 
"Have you ever noticed a couple deeply in love? They can simply sit and 
look at each other without a word. Suppose they could be frozen in one of 
those ecstatic moments, to go on with no end and with no sense of passing 
time. Would not this be 'heaven' to them? In the same way, we must 
remember that heaven is not timebound. Time, and the sense of time, will 
be swallowed up in eternity."27 Again, distinguishing this response from the 
first, let us say that in ecstatic experience, time is swallowed up subjectively, 
not objectively. And that, it seems, might suffice to preclude all boredom?8 
It might, provided the experience was sufficiently absorbing to suspend 
all sense of time's passing. The question is whether an experience could be 
that engaging if endlessly protracted. I remember once losing track of time 
when listening to a professional racconteur of Irish folk tales recite story 
after story. I could hardly believe I had been listening for two hours! 
However, had he started to repeat himself, the spell would have broken. So 
it appears that the present suggestion gets us no farther than the preceding. 
I might have enjoyed the tales whether or not I lost all sense of time, but I 
would not have lost all sense of time had the tales not been so enjoyable. 
And for that, they had to be new. Familiarity would have dulled their fas-
cination. 
The like might hold true even for experiences as exalted as the kind 
Saint Teresa glowingly describes: 
that cannot be told which [the soul] feels when our Lord admits it to 
the understanding of His secrets and of His mighty works. The joy of 
this is so far above all conceivable joys, that it may well make us loathe 
all the joys of earth; for they are all but dross; and it is an odious thing 
to make them enter into the comparison, even if we might have them 
forever. Those which our Lord gives, what are they? One drop only of 
the waters of the overflowing river which He is reserving for US.29 
The inexhaustible, everflowing river, we might add. Otherwise, as present-
ly constituted, we might not experience forever the joy that Teresa 
describes, of being admitted to "His secrets and His mighty works." 
However, what needs to be questioned and seldom is with respect to the 
tedium of immortality, is whether boredom with the familiar is either an 
inseparable or a desirable aspect of human nature. 
5. Eternal Youthfulness 
As an adult, I would not want the story teller to tell the same tale over and 
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over again (still less in identical words), but a child might."l And this 
would indicate a deficiency not in the child but in me. Chesterton draws 
the contrast with characteristic vigor: 
A child kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of 
life. Because children have abounding vitality, because they are in 
spirit fierce and free, therefore they want things repeated and 
unchanged. They always say, "Do it again"; and the grown-up per-
son does it again until he is nearly dead. For grown-up people are not 
strong enough to exult in monotony.'l 
"Strong enough" may not be quite the right phrase, but this is true: what 
appeals to children a tenth time does not appeal to us adults a tenth time. 
We tire more readily of the game, the story, the song. Eventually, we may 
weary of a world as fantastic as this one, because it has grown familiar. 
Indeed, we typically do, at least to some extent: 
Heaven lies about us in our 
infancy! 
Shades of the prison-house begin to 
close 
Upon the growing boy. 
Why this is so invites conjecture. Has evolution programmed us for live-
ly then declining interest? (Compare the kitten and the cat.) Or do various 
contrary influences smother the initial spark? Or is the spark always there, 
ready to be kindled by anything new, but with less and less to kindle it in a 
world where more and more has grown familiar? Whatever the explana-
tion, we need only imagine ourselves experiencing all things-flowers, 
fields, stories, people, seasons, symphonies, sunsets, games, elephants, 
stars, hobbies, tasks, festivities-with the freshness of children, to take a 
first, long stride toward heaven. Two further strides would take us there. 
Imagine away all present pains and tribulations, then heighten our experi-
ences and activities in ways such as those already suggested (for instance, 
by Saint Teresa), and that would be heaven. Extend the experiences and 
activities indefinitely, without loss of youthful appreciation, and that 
would be Eternal Life. 
So, is such an adjustment in our nature possible? Selectively, it may 
already be realized. I think, for instance, of the fan who, when the musical 
Cats closed on Broadway after a record run, had seen the show hundreds 
of times. An aberration, 'perhaps, but not an unpleasant one. Closer to our 
present theme is an experience like the following, of a person who previ-
ously could conceive no state of bliss that seemed proof forever against 
boredom: 
I cannot now recall whether the revelation came suddenly or gradu-
ally; I only remember finding myself in the very midst of those won-
derful moments, beholding life for the first time in all its young intox-
ication of loveliness, its unspeakable joy, beauty, and importance. I 
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cannot say exactly what the mysterious change was. I saw no new 
thing, but I sawall the usual things in a miraculous new light-in 
what I believe is their true light. I saw for the first time how wildly 
beautiful and joyous, beyond any words of mine to describe, is the 
whole of life .... It was not that for a few keyed-up moments I imag-
ined all existence as beautiful, but that my inner vision was cleared to 
the truth so that I saw the actual loveliness which is always there, but 
which we so rarely perceive.32 
r see no reason why this experience of twenty minutes might not continue 
for many more, indeed indefinitely. It strongly suggests that boredom with 
the familiar may not be an inalienable trait of human nature. I therefore 
question Greeley's assertion, at least in part: 
It is hard to imagine any kind of human life without surprises and 
wonder. If we have lost the little child's capacity to delight in sur-
prise, to be awed by the wonder, we have not become adult; we have 
become aged and senile. The fullness of life requires a highly sensi-
tive awareness of the possibility of surprise and a powerful capacity 
for wonder. If life persistent is to be life at all, then it must be life 
filled with surprises and wonder.33 
Eternity may be full of surprises, as the third response suggests; indeed, it 
could hardly fail to be. But if familiar things can be experienced as freshly 
and appreciated with as much wonder as when they were first encoun-
tered, the surprises need not continue endlessly in order to stave off sati-
ety. I would therefore stress wonder more than surprises, as Rachel Carson 
does in a memorable passage: 
A child's world is fresh and new and beautiful, full of wonder and 
excitement. It is our misfortune that for most of us that clear-eyed 
vision, that true instinct for what is beautiful and awe-inspiring, is 
dimmed and even lost before we reach adulthood. rf I had influence 
with the good fairy who is supposed to preside over the christening 
of all children I should ask that her gift to each child in the world be a 
sense of wonder so indestructible that it would last through life, as an 
Lmfailing antidote against the boredom and disenchantments of later 
years, the sterile preoccupation with things that are artificial, the 
alienation from the sources of our strength.34 
Were God, at a heavenly christening, to bless all newcomers with a sense 
of wonder so indestructible that it would last through eternity, that gift 
would furnish an unfailing antidote to boredom. 
Richard Swinburne sees matters differently. Developing the third 
response, he writes: 
Most earthly occupations indeed pall after a time, but the reason why 
they pall is that there are no new facets to them which a man wants 
to have. And also most earthly occupations are rightly judged only to 
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be worth a finite amount of interest, because there are not ever-new 
facets to them which are greatly worthwhile having. A man who has 
molded his desires so as to seek only the good and its continuation 
would not, given the Christian doctrine of God, be bored in eternity." 
It is clear from preceding remarks how this might be questioned. 
Explaining why earthly occupations pall, Swinburne cites a single reason: 
"there are no new facets to them which a man wants to have." He appears 
to take for granted the accompanying reason, namely that people crave 
newness. If we resembled children more, we might readily continue mean-
ingful, enjoyable occupations without demanding "ever-new facets ... 
which are greatly worthwhile having." 
6. Creative Contentment 
Swinburne's closing words about seeking "only the good and its continua-
tion" open a different perspective, for our hunger for newness has another 
source besides boredom with the familiar. An imperfect world cries out for 
improvement, and improvement means progress, change-newness. There 
is no end to what may be achieved, both remedially and creatively, for 
human and global betterment. Thus staleness is not the worst defect of 
sameness. Standing still means settling for less and accepting a very imper-
fect state of affairs. The further question must therefore be faced, whether in 
a perfect state of affairs human beings would find existence meaningful. 
What would there be to strive for? 
One answer, sampled in response three, would suggest that heaven will 
be negatively, not positively, perfect. New horizons of value will always lie 
ahead. "What are the most worthwhile actions," asks Swinburne, "the most 
worthwhile tasks to pursue? I suggest that they are developing our under-
standing of the world and beautifying it, developing our friendship with 
others, and helping others toward a deeply happy life."" Such tasks might 
continue in the world to come, but could they continue indefinitely? Would 
they need to? True, with nothing further to achieve, the drive to achieve 
might wither, and in this world, where there is a great deal to achieve, that 
would be unfortunate. But suppose, in Swinburne's listing, that we under-
stood the world fully, or as fully as we could. Suppose we had beautified 
the world as fully as we could. Suppose we had developed friendships with 
as many people as fully as we could. Suppose we had helped others to as 
deeply happy a life as we could. In this hypothetical fullness of achieve-
ment, this limitless sea of perfection, would we regret the lack of further 
worlds to conquer? Should we? If we shouldn't, doubtless in a world where 
our desires had become fully attuned to reality, we wouldn't. The artist or 
poet touches up this, touches up that, then says, "Leave it alone, it's per-
fect" -and rejoices in the result. 
But forever and ever and ever? Yes, if fame meant nothing and work were 
not an end in itself, homo Jaber might finally cease fabricating and simply 
enjoy the party. "The kingdom of heaven," Jesus suggests, "may be com-
pared to a king who gave a wedding banquet for his son." (Mt 22:2) God is 
the host, Jesus the groom, and the whole heavenly court partakers in the cel-
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ebration. This biblical image suggests a different reading of Swinburne's 
final "task" of promoting others' happiness. At a wedding feast, the host 
makes people happy by inviting them to the party, supplying the where-
withal, welcoming them, making them feel at ease. The cook makes people 
happy by preparing a delectable meal. The musicians make people happy by 
playing festive music. The guests join in the merriment by dancing, singing, 
conversing, telling stories, playing games, passing the hors d' oeuvres. Since 
the participants are not building up knowledge, virtue, or the world, no limit 
threatens beyond which they cannot progress. The banquet is an ongoing 
affair and each person has a part, not only in the enjoyment but also in shar-
ing the enjoyment. For eternity and eternity, "laissez les bons temps rouler!" 
Thus Jesus' parable suggests em alternative to Swinburne's pragmatic per-
spective: "Only a task which made continued progress valuable for its own 
sake but which would take an infinite time to finish would be worth doing 
forever."37 Still, the parable is just a parable, not a precise, prophetic portrayal 
of how things will one day be. As Stewart Sutherland has noted, "the greater 
the detail, the fuller the translation of the hope for heaven, or utopia into the 
hope that x, y and z, not to mention A, B and C will come to be, then the 
greater the implausibility of the hope and the less likely it is to be widely 
shared. illS Present at the Big Bang, who could venture details of the universe to 
come? Observing planet Earth at its inception, who could imagine sequoias or 
rhinos or string quartets? Gazing on a chrysalis for the first time, who could 
surmise the many-splendored creature that would emerge? Repeatedly, no 
eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived what surprises 
God has in store. If, despite such reminders, someone wonders, "But won't I 
be bored?" the aptest response may be, "Use your imagination." 
That seems the best way to regard the "possibilities" here reviewed. None 
of these alternatives-timeless beatitude, heavenly continuation, indefinite 
progress, subjective timelessness, eternal youthfulness, creative content-
ment-is clearly possible and none is clearly impossible (though the first 
comes close). Further, it is not clear in all instances which suggestions are 
genuinely and not just conceptually compossible (here, again, the first sug-
gestion poses most problems). Moreover, all six responses link closely with 
the underlying question how and whether life beyond the grave, in this form 
or that, is possible. However, the deeper the mystery, the less reasonable it 
appears to assert that whatever form eternity might take would certainly 
have to be boring. The "tedium of immortality" may not be "unthinkable," 
but neither, in the same sense, is full, unending blessedness unthinkable. 
Here are half a dozen ways of thinking it. The first (timeless beatitude) 
stands alone. The third (indefinite progress) complements the second (heav-
enly continuation) in one direction; the fourth (subjective timelessness), the 
fifth (eternal youthfulness), and the sixth (creative contenbnent) complement 
it in others. Together, all six form a cumulative case: there are various con-
ceivable ways in which the life to come might surpass all present felicity 
without a touch of ennui. Besides these six ways there may be others, lost in 
mystery, that we do not or cannot conceive. The great mystics have 
expressed no misgivings about the tedium of eternity with God.39 
Saillt Louis Uiliversity 
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